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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Nevrekar, Saish
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Zurich; Tinbergen Institute; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Navarra; Tilburg University
摘要：This article studies mergers in markets where firms invest in a portfolio of research projects of different profitability and social value. The investment of a firm in one project imposes both a negative business-stealing and a positive business-giving externality on the rival firms. We show that when the project that is relatively more profitable for the firms appropriates a larger (smaller) fraction of the social surplus, a merger increases (decreases) consumer welfare by reducing investment...
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作者：Birulin, Oleksii; Izmalkov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Sydney; New Economic School
摘要：We consider procurement auctions in settings where potential contractors have limited funds and face ex post risks, that is, cost overruns that can lead to the contractors' defaults. The bidding strategies and the default decisions are shaped by the incentive-willing to finish-constraints, and the resource-able to finish and feasibility-constraints. We examine payment schemes where the advance share of the award is paid immediately after the auction with the rest payable upon successful comple...
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作者：Dosis, Anastasios
作者单位：ESSEC Business School
摘要：In the informed principal model with common values, I provide conditions that allow for the characterization of the set of equilibria of the game in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a mechanism to the agent. I further examine if and when restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality. Last, I provide clear guidelines for solving economic applications, such as insurance, procurement, security design, and bilateral trading, of the informed princ...
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作者：Shi, Fanqi; Xing, Yiqing
作者单位：Peking University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit-demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all-sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l-th price auctions in the...
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作者：Stiebale, Joel; Szuecs, Florian
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：We analyze the effects of M&A on the markups of non-merging rival firms across a broad set of industries. We exploit expert market definitions from the European Commission's merger decisions to identify relevant competitors in narrowly defined product markets and estimate markups as a measure of market power. Our results indicate that rivals increase their markups after mergers. Consistent with increases in market power, the effects are particularly pronounced when pre-merger concentration is ...
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作者：Shurtz, Ity; Eizenberg, Alon; Alkalay, Adi; Lahad, Amnon
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Clalit Health Services
摘要：Primary care is a notable example of a service industry where capacity-constrained suppliers face fluctuating demand levels. To meet this challenge, physicians trade off their time with patients with other inputs such as lab tests and referrals. We study this tradeoff using administrative data from a large Israeli HMO where the absence of colleagues generates exogenous variation in physician workload. We motivate and estimate a range of specifications, from a classic exclusion restriction with...
