Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shi, Fanqi; Xing, Yiqing
• 署名单位: Peking University; Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12423
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 703-732
• 关键词: equilibria

摘要

We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit-demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all-sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l-th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions.