On the informed principal model with common values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dosis, Anastasios
• 署名单位: ESSEC Business School
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12424
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 792-825
• 关键词: agent relationship; insurance markets; mechanism design; equilibrium; seller

摘要

In the informed principal model with common values, I provide conditions that allow for the characterization of the set of equilibria of the game in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a mechanism to the agent. I further examine if and when restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss of generality. Last, I provide clear guidelines for solving economic applications, such as insurance, procurement, security design, and bilateral trading, of the informed principal model. The results are compared with and shown to significantly differ from those obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1992).