-
作者：Hovenkamp, Erik; Lemus, Jorge; Turner, John L.
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Innovative product developers are often uninformed about relevant patents. Patentees may exploit this by strategically lurking-refraining from ex ante licensing in the hope that developers will unwittingly infringe, creating an opportunity for patent holdup. We contribute to the literature by introducing a framework to explore when strategic lurking is profitable and how it affects developers' technology decisions. We find that lurking is pervasive in equilibrium, and it may lead to inefficien...
-
作者：Bonnet, Celine; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; AgroParisTech; INRAE; Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer-retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an equilibrium of fear. We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail ...
-
作者：Bobtcheff, Catherine; Levy, Raphael; Mariotti, Thomas
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Firms receiving independent signals on a common-value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner-take-all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strate...
-
作者：Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
作者单位：University of Munster; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：To help households and firms with exploding energy costs in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, a new policy called the energy price brake was implemented. A unique feature of this relief measure is that it provides a transfer that increases in the consumer's contractual per-unit price of energy. In a formal model, we show that this policy creates incentives for moral hazard of energy providers to raise per-unit prices. Whereas this moral hazard problem increases the policy's fiscal costs, it al...
-
作者：Bisceglia, Michele; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Bergamo
摘要：We study a two-period industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. We characterize novel semi-separating equilibria where principals randomize in one or both periods. These equilibria have the following implications for industry dynamics and firms' performance. First, despite some principals learning their agents' type early on, aggregate output need not increase over time: the inefficiencies generated by ...
-
作者：Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：This article studies the verifiable disclosure of data by an informed expert whose bias direction is unknown to the decision maker. It shows that the expert's disclosure induces the decision maker to choose an action biased in the expert's desired direction. The pattern of manipulation depends on the weighted mass of left and right-biased expert types with the same ideal action. All expert types with bias on the side with lower weighted mass, and a subset of types with bias on the other side, ...
