Manipulative Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mezzetti, Claudio
• 署名单位: University of Queensland
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12497
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 184-193
• 关键词: information-transmission; persuasion; games; news

摘要

This article studies the verifiable disclosure of data by an informed expert whose bias direction is unknown to the decision maker. It shows that the expert's disclosure induces the decision maker to choose an action biased in the expert's desired direction. The pattern of manipulation depends on the weighted mass of left and right-biased expert types with the same ideal action. All expert types with bias on the side with lower weighted mass, and a subset of types with bias on the other side, induce the choice of their ideal action; they fully manipulate. All other expert types partially manipulate.