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作者：Seim, Katja; Vitorino, Maria Ana
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; INSEAD Business School
摘要：This article empirically examines the drip pricing behavior of firms, where consumers purchase a base product and may later buy an add-on, often without anticipating the need for it. A loss leader pricing strategy emerges, with firms pricing the base product below, and the add-on above, standalone levels. Using data from the Portuguese driving instruction market, we find that base course prices decrease with competition, while prices for add-on repeat courses do not. A survey reveals that at l...
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作者：Rottner, Claudio
作者单位：University of Bayreuth
摘要：This article investigates a multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auction where the auctioneer fixes total spending and maximizes the quantity procured with their predetermined, secret budget. Previous literature has analyzed fixed-quantity auctions, where the traded quantity is fixed but unknown to the bidders. Compared to such auctions, budget auctions lower the auctioneer's costs by introducing an additional interaction between a bidder's bids; bidders not only weigh a higher profit margin on a...
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作者：Luo, Yao; Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of Toronto; Kyoto University
摘要：Procurement projects often involve substantial uncertainty in inputs at the time of contracting. Whether the procurer or contractor assumes such risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. We develop a model of auction contracts where bidders have multidimensional private information. Bidders balance skewed bidding and risk exposure; both efficient and inefficient bidders submit a low bid via skewed bidding. We document evidence of i) risk-balancing behavior through bid portfolio forma...
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作者：Hovenkamp, Erik; Lemus, Jorge; Turner, John L.
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Innovative product developers are often uninformed about relevant patents. Patentees may exploit this by strategically lurking-refraining from ex ante licensing in the hope that developers will unwittingly infringe, creating an opportunity for patent holdup. We contribute to the literature by introducing a framework to explore when strategic lurking is profitable and how it affects developers' technology decisions. We find that lurking is pervasive in equilibrium, and it may lead to inefficien...
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作者：Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
作者单位：University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the adoption of nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) by US hospitals. I consider a timing game of new technology adoption. The dynamic game takes timing decisions and strategic interaction into account. Using a panel data set of US hospitals, cross sectional variation in adoption times, market structure and demand is exploited to recover the profit and cost parameters. In counterfactuals, I quantify to what extent the timing of adoption is caused by a preemptive motive. ...
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作者：Ning, Z. Eddie
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Some projects require collaboration between firms to implement. The expected return from such a project can change over time due to evolving market conditions or the arrival of new information. Each firm may also choose an outside option rather than collaborating. In such a case, when is the joint project implemented, and how do firms split the return? To address these questions, the paper studies a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining with a stochastic cake and outside options. I sho...
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作者：Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
作者单位：University of Munster; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：To help households and firms with exploding energy costs in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, a new policy called the energy price brake was implemented. A unique feature of this relief measure is that it provides a transfer that increases in the consumer's contractual per-unit price of energy. In a formal model, we show that this policy creates incentives for moral hazard of energy providers to raise per-unit prices. Whereas this moral hazard problem increases the policy's fiscal costs, it al...
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作者：Benatia, David; de Villemeur, etienne Billette
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Lille; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：This article investigates the incentives for firms with market power to manipulate markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. We first study the behavior of a dominant firm in a two-period model with demand uncertainty. We then use the model's predictions and a machine learning approach to investigate multiple occurrences of reneging on long-term commitments in Alberta's electricity market in 2010-2011. We find that a supplier significantly increased its revenues by strategicall...
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作者：Rey, Patrick; Spiegel, Yossi; Stahl, Konrad
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Tel Aviv University; Leibniz Association; University of Mannheim; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the entrant then decides whether to stay or exit. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, monopolization, and recurrent predation. We then analy...
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作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study the implications of data privacy when consumers' outside options are endogenously determined by their efforts. Data control refers to consumers' ability to opt out of data collection on their efforts. Data disclosure rate refers to the likelihood that the collected data are shared with a monopolist. I examine their differences and consider how their interplay affects welfare. Without data control, the data disclosure rate affects the monopolist's profit nonmonotonically but has no impa...
