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作者：Bisceglia, Michele; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Bergamo
摘要：We study a two-period industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. We characterize novel semi-separating equilibria where principals randomize in one or both periods. These equilibria have the following implications for industry dynamics and firms' performance. First, despite some principals learning their agents' type early on, aggregate output need not increase over time: the inefficiencies generated by ...
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作者：Vollmer, Drew
摘要：In what circumstances is allowing resale more efficient than providing refunds? I study common aftermarket policies in perishable goods markets with demand uncertainty. Using primary and resale market data on college football ticket sales, I estimate a structural model comparing resale, which has flexible prices but incurs frictions, to a partial refund scheme, which is centralized but has rigid prices. In the model, consumers anticipate shocks when making initial purchases, then engage in res...
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作者：Bonnet, Celine; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：INRAE; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite Paris Saclay; INRAE; AgroParisTech
摘要：We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer-retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an equilibrium of fear. We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail ...
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Schutz, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct-firm price competition with CES and logit demand, allowing for arbitrary firm and product heterogeneity. We provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and establish the dynamic optimality of a myopic, consumer-surplus-based merger approval policy. We also study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger. Finally, we show that the market power effect of a merger, defin...
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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms and government agencies increasingly use online contests to find solutions to problems. These contests allow players to make multiple attempts, and their progress is tracked on a real-time public leaderboard. Although the contests are dynamic, contest sponsors miss the opportunity to dynamically shape players' incentives, as they award the entire prize pool based only on players' final rankings. We propose the use of contingent prizes that depend on the game's history to incentivize play...
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作者：Duarte, Marco; Magnolfi, Lorenzo; Roncoroni, Camilla
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Warwick
摘要：Consumer cooperatives are firms owned by their customers. Although their organizational form should commit these firms not to exploit their market power, in practice, weak governance may allow managers to pursue other objectives. Using data and a structural model, we test whether consumer cooperatives in the Italian supermarket industry act as profit-maximizing firms. We find no significant deviations from profit maximization. Based on a counterfactual exercise, even a mild degree of internali...
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作者：Knutsen, Magnus Vage
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：I set up a dynamic experience goods model where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where the seller has reputational concerns. The key innovation of the article is to endogenize prices in this framework, specifically by endowing either the seller or the buyers with the ability to post price. I show that influence over prices has a strong impact on equilibrium characteristics. If the seller posts price, equilibria will display work-shirk dynamics. If the buy...
