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作者：Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Sjoestroem, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Osaka; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and...
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作者：Hanany, Eran; Klibanoff, Peter
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University
摘要：We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg's paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes' rule to subsets of the set of prior...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：Boston University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Individuals often lose confidence in their prospects as they approach the 'moment of truth.' An axiomatic model of such individuals is provided. The model adapts and extends (by relaxing the Independence axiom) Gul and Pesendorfer's model of temptation and self-control to capture an individual who changes her beliefs so as to become more pessimistic as payoff time approaches. In a variation of the model, the individual becomes more optimistic at an ex post stage in order to feel better about h...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Miller, David A.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade can be supported in each period if the discount factor is at least one half. In contrast, when the budget must balance ex post, efficiency is not attainable, and furthermore for a wide range of probabilit...
