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作者：Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Sjoestroem, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Osaka; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
摘要：A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob, either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face uncertainty: they do not know the payoff-relevant probability. Alice offers a contract to Bob. If he accepts this contract then he must announce the probability distribution before any data are observed. Once the...
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作者：Eyster, Erik; Kittsteiner, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters. Departing from their parties' platforms is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter's preferred position in every constituency. Because the candidate whose party is located closer to the median voter gets a high...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Raimondo, Roberto C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Melbourne
摘要：We provide a geometric test of whether a general equilibrium incomplete markets (GEI) economy has Hart points-points at which the rank of the securities payoff matrix drops. Condition (H) says that, at each nonterminal node, there is an affine set (of appropriate dimension) that intersects all of a well-specified set of convex polyhedra. If the economy has Hart points, then Condition (H) is satisfied; consequently, if condition (H) fails, the economy has no Hart points. The shapes of the conve...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Samet, Dov
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player's moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on the set of her similarity classes. In this equilibrium each player's strategy is optimal in the sense that at each of her nodes, a player chooses a move that belongs to a class with maximum valuation. The valuation of each player is consistent with the s...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; New York University
摘要：We address the following question: When can one person properly be said to be more delay averse than another? In reply, several (nested) comparison methods are developed. These methods yield a theory of delay aversion which parallels that of risk aversion. The applied strength of this theory is demonstrated in a variety of dynamic economic settings, including the classical optimal growth and tree cutting problems, repeated games, and bargaining. Both time-consistent and time-inconsistent scena...
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作者：Hanany, Eran; Klibanoff, Peter
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University
摘要：We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity. These rules apply to the preferences with multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and are the first, for any model of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg's paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes' rule to subsets of the set of prior...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there exists a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without noise, equilib...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：Boston University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Individuals often lose confidence in their prospects as they approach the 'moment of truth.' An axiomatic model of such individuals is provided. The model adapts and extends (by relaxing the Independence axiom) Gul and Pesendorfer's model of temptation and self-control to capture an individual who changes her beliefs so as to become more pessimistic as payoff time approaches. In a variation of the model, the individual becomes more optimistic at an ex post stage in order to feel better about h...
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作者：Zame, William R.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：A long Utilitarian tradition has the ideal of equal regard for all individuals, both those now living and those yet to be born. The literature formalizes this ideal as asking for a preference relation on the space of infinite utility streams that is complete, transitive, invariant to finite permutations, and respects the Pareto ordering; an ethical preference relation, for short. This paper argues that operationalizing this ideal is problematic. Most simply, every ethical preference relation h...
