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作者：Calcagno, Riccardo; Kamada, Yuichiro; Lovo, Stefano; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：emlyon business school; Yale University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Stanford University
摘要：We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline. In two-player common interest games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In opposing interest games, which...
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作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; University of York - UK
摘要：The transfer problem refers to the possibility that a donor country could end up better off after giving away some resources to another country. The simplest version of that problem can be formulated in a two consumer exchange economy with fixed total resources. The existence of a transfer problem at some equilibrium is known to be equivalent to instability in the case of two goods. This characterization is extended to an arbitrary number of goods by showing that a transfer problem exists at a...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the policies that can be implemented from any initial default in a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multidimensional and infinite policy spaces...
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作者：Goswami, Mridu Prabal; Mitra, Manipushpak; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：In this paper, we revisit a longstanding question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz 1972). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction design, we show that in a specific quasilinear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF that satisfies non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, but the two-person v...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We present a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The platforms include public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate, and the level of public debt. Voters cast their vote after seeing the platforms and elect representatives according to a majoritarian winner take all system. The level of debt, by affecting the budget con...
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作者：Kamihigashi, Takashi; Stachurski, John
作者单位：Kobe University; Kobe University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper extends a family of well known stability theorems for monotone economies to a significantly larger class of models. We provide a set of general conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of stationary distributions when monotonicity holds. The conditions in our main result are both necessary and sufficient for global stability of monotone economies that satisfy a weak mixing condition introduced in the paper. Through our analysis, we develop new insights into the nature and...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Smith, Doug
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters' knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters' behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which voters' behavior ...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu et al. (1990). These efficiency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set are generated. An important ...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Huelya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Southampton
摘要：We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legisl...
