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作者：Chandrasekher, Madhav
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies an infinite-horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to the principal. Observation reports, if truthful, can serve as a monitoring instrument to discipline the agents. However, reports are cheap talk so that it is also possible for agents to collude, i.e., whe...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in super-modular games, an almost glo...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：We study a variant of the repeated prisoner's dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability; that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the opponent's foresight ability. We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the game admits an evolutionarily stable strategy, in which agents who look one step ahead and agents who look ...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Maastricht University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：The transferable utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed household consumption behavior to be consistent with transferable utility. We also show that these conditions are testable by means of integer programming methods.
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find that the cooperative value function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the efficient cutoff belief. This finding extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect...
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作者：Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) and of a randomized strategy equilibrium in distributional form (RSED). We offer a resolution of two longstanding open problems and show that (i) any MSE induces a RSED and any RSED can be lifted to a MSE, and (ii) a mixed strategy profile is ...
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作者：Peski, Marcin; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually rational payoff sets for this environment, and we prove a folk theorem under imperfect monitoring. Our setting differs significantly from the case considered in previous literature (Dutta 1995, Fudenberg and ...
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作者：Riedel, Frank; Hellmann, Tobias
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Foster and Hart propose a measure of riskiness for discrete random variables. Their defining equation has no solution for many common continuous distributions. We show how to extend consistently the definition of riskiness to continuous random variables. For many continuous random variables, the risk measure is equal to the worst-case risk measure, i.e., the maximal possible loss incurred by that gamble. For many discrete gambles with a large number of values, the Foster-Hart riskiness is clos...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that relationship: that is, information is local. This paper investigates when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible, then public information can only be replicated if the network...
