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作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars A.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Ottawa; University of Chicago
摘要：We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria includes those with nondifferentiable payoffs and discontinuous choices, as well as equilibria that ...
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作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume; Weill, Pierre-Olivier; Wong, Tsz-Nga
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We construct a continuous-time new-monetarist economy that displays an endogenous, nondegenerate distribution of money holdings. Properties of equilibria are obtained analytically and equilibria are solved in closed form in a variety of cases. Lump-sum transfers financed with money creation are welfare-enhancing when labor productivity is low whereas regressive transfers approach first best when labor productivity is high and agents are not too impatient. We introduce illiquid government bonds...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We study a class of chip strategies in repeated games of incomplete information. This class generalizes the strategies studied by Mobius () in the context of a favor-exchange model and the strategies studied in our companion paper, Olszewski and Safronov (). In two-player games, if players have private values and their types evolve according to independent Markov chains, then under very mild conditions on the stage game, the efficient outcome can be approximated by chip-strategy equilibria whe...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We introduce a learning framework in which a principal seeks to determine the ability of a strategic agent. The principal assigns a test consisting of a finite sequence of tasks. The test is adaptive: each task that is assigned can depend on the agent's past performance. The probability of success on a task is jointly determined by the agent's privately known ability and an unobserved effort level that he chooses to maximize the probability of passing the test. We identify a simple monotonicit...
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作者：Gallo, Oihane; Inarra, Elena
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs that they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs are insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce...
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作者：Ke, Rongzhu; Ryan, Christopher Thomas
作者单位：Hong Kong Baptist University; University of Chicago
摘要：Principal-agent models are pervasive in theoretical and applied economics, but their analysis has largely been limited to the first-order approach (FOA), where incentive compatibility is replaced by a first-order condition. This paper presents a new approach to solving a wide class of principal-agent problems that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property but may fail to meet the requirements of the FOA. Our approach solves the problem via tackling a max-min-max formulation over agent act...
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作者：Bardhi, Arjada; Guo, Yingni
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Unde...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We define necessary and sufficient conditions on prices and incomes under which quantity choices can violate SARP (strong axiom of revealed preference) but not WARP (weak axiom of revealed preference). As SARP extends WARP by additionally imposing transitivity on the revealed preference relation, this effectively defines the conditions under which transitivity adds bite to the empirical analysis. For finite data sets, our characterization takes the form of a triangular condition that must hold...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We study chip-strategy equilibria in two-player repeated games. Intuitively, in these equilibria, players exchange favors by taking individually suboptimal actions if these actions create a gain for the opponent larger than the player's loss from taking them. In exchange, the player who provides a favor implicitly obtains from the opponent a chip that entitles the player to receiving a favor at some future date. Players are initially endowed with a number of chips, and a player who runs out of...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：When is a mechanism designer justified in only asking for ordinal information about preferences? Simple examples show that even if the planner's goal (expressed by a social choice correspondence (SCC)) depends only on ordinal information, eliciting cardinal information may help with incentives. However, if agents may be uncertain about their own cardinal preferences, then a strong robustness requirement can justify the focus on ordinal mechanisms. Specifically, when agents' preferences over pu...
