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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Cologne
摘要：A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e., that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: Either there are no ties or th...
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作者：Waki, Yuichiro; Dennis, Richard; Fujiwara, Ippei
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of Glasgow; Keio University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the new Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem, we find that it is optimal to grant constrained discret...
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作者：Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both an absence of intergroup collaboration...
