Rationing rules and stable coalition structures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gallo, Oihane; Inarra, Elena
• 署名单位: University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2870
• 发表日期: 2018-09-01
• 页码: 933-950
• 关键词: Coalition formation; hedonic games; core stability; rationing rules

摘要

This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs that they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs are insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce hedonic games that admit core stability.