-
作者：Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous-time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to a net present value (NPV) criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects that require higher pay-performance sensitivity. When the continuation value is large, investment projects are chos...
-
作者：Duncan, Alfred; Nolan, Charles
作者单位：University of Kent; University of Glasgow
摘要：We show how the prospect of disputes over firms' revenue reports promotes debt financing over equity. This is demonstrated in a costly state verification model with a risk-averse entrepreneur. The prospect of disputes encourages incentive contracts that limit penalties and avoid stochastic monitoring, even when the lender can commit to stochastic monitoring. Consequently, optimal contracts shift from equity toward standard debt. In short, when audit signals are weakly correlated with true inco...
-
作者：Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Essex
摘要：We study directed search equilibria in a decentralized market with adverse selection, where uninformed buyers post general trading mechanisms and informed sellers select one of them. We show that this has differing and significant implications with respect to the traditional approach, based on bilateral contracting between the parties. In equilibrium, all buyers post the same mechanism and low-quality sellers receive priority in any meeting with a buyer. Also, buyers make strictly higher profi...
-
作者：Loertscher, Simon; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Bonn
摘要：For a partnership model with general type distributions and interdependent values, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanisms that, for arbitrary initial ownership, maximize any convex combination of revenue and social surplus. The solution involves ironing around typically interior worst-off types, which are endogenously determined. The optimal ownership structures are such that, with identical distributions, equal shares are always optimal. With nonidentical distributions, the optimal shar...
-
作者：Au, Pak Hung
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：An agent searches sequentially for advice from multiple experts concerning the payoff of taking an operation. After incurring a positive search cost, the agent can consult an expert whose interest is partially aligned with him. There are infinitely many experts, each has access to an identically and conditionally independent signal structure about the payoff, and each makes a recommendation after observing the signal realization. We find that the experts face a loser's curse, which could hampe...
-
作者：Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type affects only the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, that can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation-proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation-proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types abov...
-
作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe actions and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find a general condition under which the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state when players are patient. This result ensures that players can punish or reward their opponents via continuation payoffs in a flexible way. Then we prove the folk theorem, assuming that public randomization is...
-
作者：Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; Ashoka University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long-term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players essential for realizing every maximum matching can a...
-
作者：Kambe, Shinsuke
作者单位：Gakushuin University
摘要：This paper studies an N-person war of attrition that needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, may the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition change over time. We introduce the possibility of a noncompromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and ...
