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作者：Noda, Shunya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and f...
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作者：Foerster, Manuel
作者单位：University of Hamburg
摘要：We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic equilibria. Second, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a fully informative farsighted (perfect Bayesian) equili...
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作者：Faro, Jose Heleno; Lefort, Jean-Philippe
作者单位：Insper; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We characterize prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using a model proposed by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) that jointly considers objective and subjective rationality. These rationality concepts are subject to the Bewley unanimity rule and maxmin expected utility, respectively, with a common set of priors and the same utility over consequences. We use this setup with two preference relations to develop a novel rationale for full Bayesian updating of maxmin expected utility...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implicatio...
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作者：Tierney, Ryan
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We identify a large subdomain, ?, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of ?, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set ? consists of all economies in which competitive equilibrium would prescribe that all agents consume a positive quantity of money. Since we study quasilinear preferences, this is the domain of primary interest. Our locally non-manipulable r...
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作者：Elliott, Matthew; Nava, Francesco
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched with whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reaches agreement, they exit the market. Alternative possible matches affect agents' bargaining positions. We ask under which conditions such markets clear efficiently and find that inefficienciesmismatch and delayfeature freque...
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作者：Galperti, Simone
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about intratemporal trade-offs between goods. It explains the subtle mechanism that renders budgets useful commitments, their intera...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE
摘要：We study a discriminatory limit-order book in which market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to serve a privately informed insider. Our model allows for general nonparametric specifications of preferences and arbitrary discrete distributions for the insider's private information. Adverse selection severely restricts equilibrium outcomes: in any pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs, pricing must be linear and at most one type can trade, leading to an extreme form of market breakdown....
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作者：Ke, Shaowei
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper proposes simple axioms that characterize a generalization of backward induction. At any node of a decision tree, the decision maker looks forward a fixed number of stages perfectly. Beyond that, the decision maker aggregates continuation values according to a function that captures reasoning under unpredictability. The model is uniquely identified from the decision maker's preference over decision trees. Confronting a decision tree, the decision maker iteratively revises her plan fo...
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作者：Block, Juan I.; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than mixed equilibria. When agents observe both the payoff distribution of other agents and the actions that led to those payoffs, and ...
