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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe actions and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find a general condition under which the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state when players are patient. This result ensures that players can punish or reward their opponents via continuation payoffs in a flexible way. Then we prove the folk theorem, assuming that public randomization is...
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model m...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi-linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable statements is sufficiently rich, we show that there is an ex ante profit-maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, the allocatio...
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作者：Perez-Nievas, Mikel; Conde-Ruiz, Jose I.; Gimenez, Eduardo L.
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Complutense University of Madrid; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：This paper explores the properties of the notions of A-efficiency and P-efficiency, which were proposed by Golosov et al. (2007), to evaluate allocations in a general overlapping generations setting in which fertility choices are endogenously selected from a continuum and any two agents of the same generation are identical. First, we show that the properties of A-efficient allocations vary depending on the criterion used to identify potential agents. If one identifies potential agents by their...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio
作者单位：Yale University; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：We study impersonal exchange and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and trust-building. The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating des...
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作者：Meyer, Margaret; de Barreda, Ines Moreno; Nafziger, Julia
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Oxford; Aarhus University
摘要：This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver, and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium that fully reveals the state, there exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), i...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; Ashoka University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long-term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players essential for realizing every maximum matching can a...
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作者：Kambe, Shinsuke
作者单位：Gakushuin University
摘要：This paper studies an N-person war of attrition that needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, may the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition change over time. We introduce the possibility of a noncompromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and ...
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作者：Massari, Filippo
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect traders' survival and that markets can favor lucky traders with incorrect beliefs over skilled traders with accurate beliefs. My model allows for a clear distinction between luck and skills, and it sho...
