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作者：Basu, Pathikrit; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the degree of falsifiability of theories of choice. A theory is easy to falsify if relatively small data sets are enough to guarantee that the theory can be falsified: the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of a theory is the largest sample size for which the theory is never falsifiable. VC dimension is motivated strategically. We consider a model with a strategic proponent of a theory and a skeptical consumer, or user, of theories. The former presents experimental evidence in favor o...
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作者：Baisa, Brian
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that re...
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作者：Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL); Princeton University
摘要：We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade-off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gai...
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作者：Bervoets, Sebastian; Bravo, Mario; Faure, Mathieu
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Universidad de Santiago de Chile
摘要：While payoff-based learning models are almost exclusively devised for finite action games, where players can test every action, it is harder to design such learning processes for continuous games. We construct a stochastic learning rule, designed for games with continuous action sets, which requires no sophistication from the players and is simple to implement: players update their actions according to variations in own payoff between current and previous action. We then analyze its behavior i...
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作者：Szkup, Michal
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper provides a general analysis of comparative statics results in global games. I show that the effect of a change in any parameter of a global game model of regime change can be decomposed into a direct effect, which captures the effect of a change in parameters when agents' beliefs are held constant, and a multiplier effect, which captures the role of adjustments in agents' beliefs. I characterize conditions under which the multiplier effect is strong and relate it to the strength of ...
