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作者：Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka
摘要：This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (i) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property, (ii) we establish a revenue uniqueness result (for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can implement it), and (iii) we show that every dominant strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue-ma...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term risky assets. Moreover, in each problem, the ranking is represented by the same risk index as in the case of constant absolute risk aversion utility agents and normally distributed risky assets.
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作者：Li, Jian
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：We commonly think of information as an instrument for better decisions, yet evidence suggests that people often decline free information in nonstrategic scenarios. This paper provides a theory for how a dynamically-consistent decision maker can be averse to partial information as a consequence of ambiguity aversion. It introduces a class of recursive preferences on an extended choice domain, which allows the preferences to depend on how information is dynamically revealed and to depart from th...
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Warwick; Ashoka University; University of Helsinki
摘要：Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance, by Harsanyi and Ray and Vohra, have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional moves in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these ...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：Guided by evidence from eye-tracking studies of choice, pairwise comparison is assumed to be the building block of the decision-making procedure. A decision-maker with a rational preference may nevertheless consider the constituent pairwise comparisons gradually, easier comparisons preceding difficult ones. Facing a choice problem, she may be unable to complete all relevant comparisons and choose with equal odds from alternatives not found inferior. Stochastic choice data consistent with such ...
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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I develop two related solution concepts-equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior-that capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not require, but may use, the apparatus of a dynamic process or a protocol that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non-cooperative and...
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作者：Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin
作者单位：Amherst College; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this setting and use these results to give a tractable characterization of equilibrium behavior. We use this characterization to study the policy of capping the amount that may be won by large bidders in the...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Gugl, Elisabeth
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Victoria
摘要：While many theoretical works, particularly in family economics, rely on the transferable utility (TU) assumption, its exact implications in terms of individual preferences have never been fully worked out. In this paper, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to satisfy the TU property. We express these conditions in terms of both individual indirect utilities and individual demand functions. Last, we describe the link between this question and a standard problem i...
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作者：Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show ho...
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作者：Nirei, Makoto; Stachurski, John; Watanabe, Tsutomu
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Australian National University
摘要：This study provides an explanation for the emergence of power laws in asset trading volume and returns. We consider a two-state model with binary actions, where traders infer other traders' private signals regarding the value of an asset from their actions and adjust their own behavior accordingly. We prove that this leads to power laws for equilibrium volume and returns whenever the number of traders is large and the signals for asset value are sufficiently noisy. We also provide numerical re...
