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作者：Chade, Hector; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Northwestern University
摘要：We define and explore no-upward-crossing (NUC), a condition satisfied by every parameterized family of distributions commonly used in economic applications. Under smoothness assumptions, NUC is equivalent to log-supermodularity of the negative of the derivative of the distribution with respect to the parameter. It is characterized by a natural monotone comparative static and is central in establishing quasi-concavity in a family of decision problems. As an application, we revisit the first-ord...
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作者：Ryvkin, Dmitry; Drugov, Mikhail
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; New Economic School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In winner-take-all tournaments, agents' performance is determined jointly by effort and luck, and the top performer is rewarded. We study the impact of the shape of luck-the details of the distribution of performance shocks-on incentives in such settings. We are concerned with the effects of increasing the number of competitors, which can be deterministic or stochastic, on individual and aggregate effort. We show that these effects are determined by the shape of the density and failure (hazard...
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作者：Li, Wei; Tan, Xu
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Agents in a network want to learn the true state of the world from their own signals and their neighbors' reports. Agents know only their local networks, consisting of their neighbors and the links among them. Every agent is Bayesian with the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed reports in her loca...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; University of Chicago; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of the bidders' independent signals. If the revenue maximizing solution is to sell the object with probability 1, then an optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, namely, the highest price such that every type of every bidder is willing to buy the object. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than 1, then optimal mechanisms skew the allocation tow...
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作者：Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Nakajima, Daisuke; Ozdenoren, Emre
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Otaru University of Commerce; University of London; London Business School
摘要：This paper provides a behavioral foundation for modeling willpower as a limited cognitive resource that bridges the standard utility maximization and Strotz models. Using the agent's ex ante preferences and ex post choices, we derive a representation that captures key behavioral traits of willpower-constrained decision making. We use the model to study the pricing problem of a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces consumers with limited willpower. We show that the optimal contract often consi...
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作者：Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Is it possible to guarantee that the mere exposure of a subject to a belief elicitation task will not affect the very same beliefs that we are trying to elicit? In this paper, we introduce mechanisms that make it simultaneously strictly dominant for the subject (a) not to acquire any information that could potentially lead to belief updating as a response to the incentives provided by the mechanism itself, and (b) to report his beliefs truthfully. Such mechanisms are calledrobust scoring rules...
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作者：Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：University of Bern; Peking University; University of Zurich
摘要：We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely...
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作者：Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Basque Country
摘要：Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989) Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Y...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the firm can only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet effect is in place since the firm has the incentive to change the terms of trade and offer more demanding contracts when it learns that the worker is highly productive. As the parties become arbitrarily...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants' performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex ante asymmetric in their abilities and prize valuations, and there may be complete or incomplete information about these parameters. The prize valuations and performance costs may be linear, concave, or convex. A main novel takeaway ...
