Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin
• 署名单位: Amherst College; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2939
• 发表日期: 2020-01-01
• 页码: 1-28
• 关键词: Multi-unit auctions; resale; quantity caps

摘要

We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this setting and use these results to give a tractable characterization of equilibrium behavior. We use this characterization to study the policy of capping the amount that may be won by large bidders in the auction, a policy that has received little attention in the auction literature. Our analysis shows that the trade-offs involved when adjusting these quantity caps can be understood in terms familiar to students of asymmetric first-price single-unit auctions. Furthermore, whether one seeks to maximize welfare or revenue can have contradictory implications for the choice of cap.