Equilibrium coalitional behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kimya, Mert
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3055
• 发表日期: 2020-05-01
• 页码: 669-714
• 关键词: Coalition formation; farsightedness; C70; C71; C72; D71

摘要

I develop two related solution concepts-equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior-that capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not require, but may use, the apparatus of a dynamic process or a protocol that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non-cooperative and the cooperative approaches to foresight.