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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Salman, Umutcan
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2013) established the testable revealed preference restrictions for stable aggregate matching with transferable and nontransferable utility and for extremal stable matchings. In this paper, we rephrase their restrictions in terms of properties on a corresponding bipartite graph. From this, we obtain a simple condition that verifies whether a given aggregate matching is rationalizable. For matchings that are not rationalizable, we provide a simple greedy algori...
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作者：Hendricks, Kenneth; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We characterize an optimal mechanism for a seller with one unit of a good facing N >= 3 buyers and a single competitor who sells another identical unit in a second-price auction. Buyers who do not get the seller's good compete in the competitor's subsequent auction. The mechanism features transfers from buyers with the two highest valuations, allocation to the buyer with the second-highest valuation, and an allocation rule that depends on the two highest valuations. It can be implemented by a ...
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作者：Cheng, Chen; Xing, Yiqing
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：Economic agents care about their relative well-being, and the comparisons are usually local. We capture this using a network model, in which an agent's payoff depends on the ranking of their allocation among their network neighbors. Given a network, an allocation is called alpha-stable if no blocking coalition whose size is an alpha fraction of the population can strictly improve their payoffs. We find a sufficient and necessary condition for a network to permit an alpha-stable allocation: the...
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作者：Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：Zhejiang University
摘要：In the context of repeated first-price auctions, we explore how a bid-rigging cartel can simultaneously overcome the difficulty of soliciting truthful private information about valuations and the difficulty of enforcing its internal mechanism. Focusing on the class of trigger-strategy collusive agreements, we explicitly characterize the optimal collusive agreement for any given discount factor. Making use of the characterization, we also explore how a long-run seller can use a reserve price to...
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作者：Delacretaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
摘要：We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is equal to the largest net Walrasian price of this agent. Consequently, the VCG deficit is equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices over all agents. Generally, whenever Walrasian prices exist, t...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Koren, Moran; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Two firms produce substitute goods of unknown quality. At each stage the firms set prices and a consumer with private information and unit demand buys from one of the firms. Both firms and consumers see the entire history of prices and purchases. Will such markets aggregate information? Will the firm with the superior product necessarily prevail? We adapt the classic social-learning model by introducing strategic dynamic pricing. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for asymptotic le...
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作者：Chen, Yi
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences, the principal wants to match a state-dependent target. I solve the optimal delegation in closed form, which sometimes prescribes actions that move in the opposite direction of the target. I provide a s...
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作者：Alcantud, Jose Carlos R.; Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto
作者单位：University of Salamanca; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Deakin University
摘要：Sufficientarianism is a prominent approach to distributive justice in political philosophy and in policy analyses. However, it is virtually absent from the formal normative economics literature. We analyze sufficientarianism axiomatically in the context of the allocation of 0-1 normalized well-being in society. We present three characterizations of the core sufficientarian criterion, which counts the number of agents who attain a good enough level of well-being. The main characterization captu...
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作者：Amador, Manuel; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University
摘要：We analyze the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation under the restriction that transfers are infeasible. Extending techniques from the delegation literature to incorporate an ex post participation constraint, we report sufficient conditions under which optimal regulation takes the form of price-cap regulation. We establish conditions under which the optimal price cap is set at a level such that no types are excluded and show that exclusion of higher cost types can be optimal when these...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University; University of International Business & Economics; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but allow for the use of lotteries and monetary transfers as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We unify the two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient ...
