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作者：Nax, Heinrich Harald; Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Zurich; Kyoto University
摘要：Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others' strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run behavior. Despite short run behavior being highly sensitive to variation in strategic reasoning abilities, this variation is not replicated in the long run. In particular, when generalized risk dominant str...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Iwasaki, Kohei; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Osaka; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper develops a model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique and robust equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to information frictions in bilateral and decentralized markets. Under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium price is increasing and accelerating during bubbles although the fundamental value is constant over time. Bubbles may be detrimental to the economy, but any announcement from the central ...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This paper proposes an epistemic approach. Agents negotiate through offers, and offers are interpreted according to the highest possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed stable if maintaining the current allocation is a rationalizable action for each agent. The main result shows an equivalence between this notion and incomplete-infor...
