Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pomatto, Luciano
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3867
• 发表日期: 2022-11-01
• 页码: 1619-1649
• 关键词: Matching; incomplete information; STABILITY; C78

摘要

A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This paper proposes an epistemic approach. Agents negotiate through offers, and offers are interpreted according to the highest possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed stable if maintaining the current allocation is a rationalizable action for each agent. The main result shows an equivalence between this notion and incomplete-information stability, a cooperative solution concept put forward by Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014) for markets with incomplete information.