Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3710
• 发表日期: 2022-05-01
• 页码: 539-559
• 关键词: Dynamic signaling; reputation building; history dependence; exit dynamics; C73; D82; D83

摘要

We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A strong type has a dominant strategy to continue. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak type plays a mixed strategy that depends only on current stakes and her historical minimum and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand.