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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study large-population repeated games where players are symmetric but not anonymous, so player-specific rewards and punishments are feasible. Players may be commitment types who always take the same action. Even though players are not anonymous, we show that an anti-folk theorem holds when the commitment action is population dominant, meaning that it secures a payoff greater than the population average payoff. For example, voluntary public goods provision in large populations is impossible ...
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作者：Teeple, Keisuke
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：I model an incomplete markets economy where unaware agents do not perceive all states of nature, so unintended default can occur when asset returns differ from what was perceived. The presence of default plays a crucial role in the proof of existence-particularly in economies where beliefs are biased-by removing perceived arbitrage opportunities with respect to delivery-adjusted asset returns. The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem fails because of default and pecuniary inefficiencies, but the ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dutta, Bhaskar
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Warwick; Ashoka University
摘要：This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network where a single attacker chooses a target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker-a comparative statics effect that is reminiscent of Brae...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel; Bolte, Lukas
作者单位：University of Toronto; Stanford University
摘要：We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty. Both parties are risk-neutral; there is no limited liability. Linear contracts, which leave the agent with a constant share of output in exchange for a fixed fee, are optimal. This result holds both in a p...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：University of Oxford; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotone categorization of quality. We characterize the sender's optimal monotone categorization, the optimality of full pooling or full separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. As an application, we study the design of a grading scheme by an educational institution th...
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作者：Hopenhayn, Hugo; Saeedi, Maryam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper addresses two central questions in markets with adverse selection: How does information impact the welfare of market participants (sellers and buyers)? Also, what is the optimal information disclosure policy and how is it affected by the planner's relative welfare weight on sellers' surplus versus consumers' surplus? We find that as a result of improved information, prices become more strongly associated with the true quality of sellers and, thus, more dispersed. This will result in...
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作者：Perez-Nievas, Mikel
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：Fertility rates are declining in many countries. But are fertility rates inefficiently low? This paper addresses this question by exploring the efficiency properties of equilibria in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility and dynastic parental altruism, using the notion of P-efficiency proposed by Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007). In contrast to Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014), who show that any equilibrium for which nonnegativity constraints on intergenerational transfe...
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作者：Foster, Dean P.; Hart, Sergiu
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Amazon.com; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：To identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into bins with the same forecast is, and thus attests to expertise. This raises the question of whether one can gain calibration without losing expertise, which we refer to as calibeating. We provide an easy way to cal...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Lanzani, Giacomo; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman's (1990) uniform convergence result to, e.g., priors that have finite support, are constrained by independence assumptions, or have a parametric form that cannot match some probability distributions. The concentrati...
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作者：Schulz, Karl; Tsyvinski, Aleh; Werquin, Nicolas
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Yale University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：Economic disruptions generally create winners and losers. The compensation problem consists of designing a reform of the existing income tax system that offsets the welfare losses of the latter by redistributing the gains of the former. We derive a formula for the compensating tax reform and its impact on the government budget when only distortionary tax instruments are available and wages are determined endogenously in general equilibrium. We apply this result to the compensation of robotizat...
