作者：Liu, Ce
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment and characterize the firms' payoffs. Firms fall into one of two categories: some firms must obtain the same payoff as they would in static...
作者：Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Essex; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Adelaide
摘要：This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
