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作者：Pereyra, Juan S.; Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Universidad de Montevideo; Deakin University
摘要：Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social planner is unable to use transfers to give incentives for agents to convey their private information. Instead, she is able to imperfectly verify their reports through signals that are positively affiliated...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Krishna, R. Vijay; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Duke University
摘要：We propose a class of dynamic models that capture subjective (and, hence, unobservable) constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can acquire, pay attention to, or absorb via an information choice process (ICP). An ICP specifies the information that can be acquired about the payoff-relevant state in the current period and how this choice affects what can be learned in the future. In spite of their generality, wherein ICPs can accommodate any dependence of the information constr...
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作者：Allman, Maxwell; Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Southern California
摘要：Lotteries are a common way to resolve ties in assignment mechanisms that ration resources. We consider a model with a continuum of agents and a finite set of resources with heterogeneous qualities, where the agents' preferences are generated from a multinomial-logit (MNL) model based on the resource qualities. We show that all agents prefer a common lottery to independent lotteries at each resource if every resource is popular, meaning that the mass of agents ranking that resource as their fir...
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作者：Antler, Yair
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Motivated by the growing discussion on the resemblance of multilevel marketing schemes to pyramid scams, we compare the two phenomena based on their underlying compensation structures. We show that a company can design a pyramid scam to exploit a network of agents with coarse beliefs and that this requires the company to charge the participants a license fee and pay them a recruitment commission for each of the people that they recruit and that their recruits recruit. We characterize the schem...
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作者：Doligalski, Pawel; Rojas, Luis E.
作者单位：University of Bristol; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We extend the theory of optimal redistributive taxation to economies with an informal sector. In particular, in our model, workers can supply labor simultaneously to the formal and the informal sectors, which we call moonlighting. The optimal tax formula contains two novel terms capturing informality responses on an intensive and an extensive margin. Both terms decrease the optimal tax rates. We estimate the model with Colombian data and find that informality strongly reduces tax rates at all ...
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作者：Kaya, Ayca
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：The founder of a start-up (principal) who has a project with uncertain returns must retain and incentivize an agent using promise of future payments and information gathering. The agent's effort incrementally advances production and such advance is a prerequisite for gathering new information. The principal decides how much information to gather based on these incremental advancements. The principal faces cash constraints. The agent's outside option is large relative to his effort cost. Equili...
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作者：Can, Burak; Pourpouneh, Mohsen; Storcken, Ton
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Oxford; University of Copenhagen; Maastricht University
摘要：Matchings in a market may have varying degrees of compromise from efficiency, fairness, and or stability. A distance function allows to quantify such concepts or the (dis)similarity between any two matchings. There are a few attempts to propose such functions; however, these are tailored for specific applications and ignore the individual preferences completely. In this paper, we construct a normative framework to quantify the difference between outcomes of market mechanisms in matching market...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Lederer, Patrick
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships. In this paper, we consider set-valued social choice correspondences (SCCs) that are strategyproof according to Fishburn's preference extension and, in particular, the top cycle, an attractive SCC that ret...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We provide conditions that simplify applying Reny's (1999) better-reply security to Bayesian games and use these conditions to prove the existence of equilibria for classes of games in which payoff discontinuities arise only at ties. These games include a general version of all-pay contests, first-prize auctions with common values, and Hotelling models with incomplete information.
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作者：Manjunath, Vikram; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Ottawa; North Carolina State University
摘要：Many centralized matching markets are preceded by interviews between participants, including the residency matches between doctors and hospitals. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews in the National Resident Matching Program were switched to a virtual format, which resulted in a dramatic and asymmetric decrease in the cost of accepting interview invitations. We study the impact of an increase in the number of doctors' interviews on their final matches. We show analytically that if doctors ...
