作者：Feng, Tangren; Niemeyer, Axel; Wu, Qinggong
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Bonn; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.
作者：Rosato, Antonio
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit demand. Equilibrium bids are history dependent and subject to a discouragement effect: the higher is the winning bid in the current round, the less aggressive are the bids of the remaining bidders in the next round. Moreover, because they experience a loss in each round in which they fail to obtain an object, bidders are willing to pay a premium to win sooner rather than later...
