Information design in multistage games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic
• 署名单位: University of Essex; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Adelaide
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4769
• 发表日期: 2023-11-01
• 页码: 1475-1509
• 关键词: Multistage games; information design; communication equilibrium; sequential communication equilibrium; information structures; Bayes' correlated equilibrium; revelation principle

摘要

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.