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作者：Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Columbia University
摘要：We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a revelation-principle result for settings in which a media...
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作者：Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long-lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when served. An agent can decide anytime whether to either join a queue of his choice or renege. I show that it is efficient to elicit agents' private information by offering a simple binary menu (i.e., two custo...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent-specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all agents choose the high action if their threshold is smaller than x and the low action otherwise. The random-utility (RU) dominant outcome x* is a maximizer of an integral of the distribution of thresholds. ...
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作者：Spiritus, Kevin; Lehmann, Etienne; Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris T.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Delft University of Technology; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule for taxpayers with multiple incomes and multiple unobserved characteristics. We identify smoothness assumptions and extensions of the single crossing conditions that enable the characterization of the optimum through variational calculus. Both the tax perturbation and mechanism design approaches yield identical results when the number of incomes equals the number of unobserved characteristics. Notably, the mechanism design approach requires ...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Tokyo
摘要：This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show...
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作者：Mitkov, Yuliyan
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I endogenize the probability of self-fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The coordinating players' actions can be based on a sunspot state, which, unlike in the classic sunspot approach, is observed with a small, idiosyncratic noise (a private sunspot). I show how private sunspots, comb...
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作者：McAdams, David; Song, Yangbo
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：An innovation (e.g., new product or idea) spreads like a virus, transmitted by those who have previously adopted it. Agents update their beliefs about innovation quality based on private signals and when they hear about the innovation. We characterize equilibrium adoption dynamics and the resulting lifecycle of virally-spread innovations. Herding on adoption can occur but only early in the innovation lifecycle, and adoption eventually ceases for all virally-spread innovations. A producer capab...
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作者：Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Kominers, Scott Duke; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many economic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scaling results from such models by removing these finiteness assumptions. Our sufficient conditions are on the theorem statement only, and not on its proof. This results in short proofs, and even allows us to use the same argument to scale similar theorems that were proven using distinctly different tools. We demonstrate the ver...
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作者：Inostroza, Nicolas; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：University of Toronto; Northwestern University
摘要：We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action. The designer does not trust the agents to play favorably to her and evaluates any policy under the worst-case scenario. First, we show that the optimal policy removes...
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作者：Kamiya, Kazuya; Kubota, So
作者单位：Kobe University; Tohoku University
摘要：We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay-all equilibrium, and prove its existence. Each buyer pays all the money holding as a corner solution to the bargaining problem and each seller produces a positive amount of goods as an interior solution. The bargaining powe...
