Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mitkov, Yuliyan
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5927
• 发表日期: 2025-05-01
• 页码: 427-451
• 关键词: Coordination problems; sunspots; strategic uncertainty; D70; D84; G01

摘要

I endogenize the probability of self-fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The coordinating players' actions can be based on a sunspot state, which, unlike in the classic sunspot approach, is observed with a small, idiosyncratic noise (a private sunspot). I show how private sunspots, combined with the action of the regime defender, can be used to derive a unique coordination probability in any equilibrium where sunspots influence actions. I show how this approach can be used to determine the probability of a sunspot-driven bank run.