Random utility coordination games on networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peski, Marcin
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5653
• 发表日期: 2025-05-01
• 页码: 583-622
• 关键词: Random utility; coordination games; networks; c7

摘要

We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent-specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all agents choose the high action if their threshold is smaller than x and the low action otherwise. The random-utility (RU) dominant outcome x* is a maximizer of an integral of the distribution of thresholds. The definition generalizes Harsanyi-Selten's risk dominance to coordination games with random utility. We show that, on each sufficiently large and fine network, there is an equilibrium that is a fuzzy convention x*. On some networks, including a city network, all equilibria are fuzzy conventions x*. Finally, fuzzy conventions x* are the only behavior that is robust to misspecification of the network structure.