Corruption in bank lending: The role of timely loan loss recognition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akins, Brian; Dou, Yiwei; Ng, Jeffrey
• 署名单位: Rice University; New York University; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.08.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 关键词: depositor discipline; MARKET DISCIPLINE; capital evidence; FIRMS; OWNERSHIP; cost; INFORMATION; insurance; QUALITY; CHINA

摘要

Building on the recent literature on corruption in bank lending, we examine the effect of country-level timely loan loss recognition by banks on lending corruption using a unique World Bank dataset that covers more than 3,600 firms across 44 countries. We find evidence consistent with timely loan loss recognition constraining lending corruption because it increases the likelihood of problem loans being uncovered earlier. In further analysis, we find timely loan loss recognition to be less associated with reduced corruption in countries where there is significant government ownership in the banking system and deposit insurance schemes. This evidence is consistent with timely loan loss recognition being less of a deterrent to lending corruption when banks are less disciplined by their capital providers. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.