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作者：Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
摘要：Using a gift-exchange experiment, we show that the ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems inherent in principal-agent settings is greatly reduced when the agent's effort is distorted by random shocks and transmitted imperfectly to the principal. Specifically, we find that gift exchange contracts without shocks encourage effort and wages well above standard predictions. However, the introduction of random shocks reduces wages and effort, regardless of whether the shocks can be ob...
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作者：Shang, Weixin; Ha, Albert Y.; Tong, Shilu
作者单位：Lingnan University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We study the problem of information sharing in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. Our analysis shows that the retailer's incentive to share information strongly depends on nonlinear production cost, competition intensity, and whether the retailer can offer a contract to charge a payment for the information. Without information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information for free when production economy i...
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作者：Agarwal, Sumit; Rosen, Richard J.; Yao, Vincent
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：Refinancing a mortgage is often one of the most important financial decisions people make. Borrowers choose the interest rate differential at which to refinance, and when that differential is reached, they need to take the steps to refinance before rates change again. Using a simple closed-form solution approximation of the optimal refinancing rule and a unique panel data set including information from a large secondary market participant on refinancing, we find that approximately 57% of borro...
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作者：Grolleau, Gilles; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutan, Angela
作者单位：Institut National de la Sante et de la Recherche Medicale (Inserm); Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Montpellier; Universite Bourgogne Europe; University of Munich; Queensland University of Technology (QUT); University of Gothenburg; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro; Universite de Montpellier
摘要：Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real-effort matrix task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with 600 experimental participants to examine whether the extent of cheating is reference dependent. Self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition-a clear indication of cheating. Ho...
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作者：Melkonyan, Tigran; Safra, Zvi
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：The paper examines the random preference model, which can explain inherent variability of preferences in managerial and individual decision making and provides axiomatizations for the utility components of two such models differentiated by the structure of core preferences: expected utility (EU) and betweenness-like preferences. We then examine the possibility of violations of weak stochastic transitivity for these models and for a model with core dual EU preferences. Such violations correspon...
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作者：Chen, Fangruo; Lai, Guoming; Xiao, Wenqiang
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作者：Baum, Joel A. C.; Bowers, Anne; Mohanram, Partha
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Research in industrial organization and strategic management has shown that rivals competing with each other in multiple markets are more willing to show each other mutual forbearance, i.e., compete less aggressively, within their spheres of influence, i.e., the markets in which each firm dominates. Sell-side equity analysts typically cover multiple stocks in common with their rivals. We examine the impact of this multipoint contact for mutual forbearance on two key dimensions of competition a...
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作者：Nasser, Sherif; Turcic, Danko
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Previous studies have shown that quantity commitment by all firms in an industry mitigates price competition. This paper shows that when firms have a choice, asymmetric outcomes can arise, with some firms choosing to commit to a quantity and other firms choosing not to. To study the commitment decision, we analyze a multistage game within a duopoly of differentiated firms a la Hotelling. In the first stage of the game, firms choose whether or not to commit to a quantity. In the second stage, e...
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作者：Bohnet, Iris; van Geen, Alexandra; Bazerman, Max
作者单位：Harvard University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Harvard University
摘要：Gender bias in the evaluation of job candidates has been demonstrated in business, government, and academia, yet little is known about how to overcome it. Blind evaluation procedures have been proven to significantly increase the likelihood that women musicians are chosen for orchestras, and they are employed by a few companies. We examine a new intervention to overcome gender bias in hiring, promotion, and job assignments: an evaluation nudge in which people are evaluated jointly rather than ...
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作者：Dai, Min; Li, Peifan; Liu, Hong; Wang, Yajun
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Washington University (WUSTL); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Most existing portfolio choice models ignore the prevalent periodic market closure and the fact that market volatility is significantly higher during trading periods. We find that market closure and the volatility difference across trading and nontrading periods significantly change optimal trading strategies. In addition, we demonstrate numerically that transaction costs can have a first-order effect on liquidity premia that is largely comparable to empirical findings. Moreover, this effect o...
