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作者:Belot, Michele; Schroeder, Marina
作者单位:University of Edinburgh; University of Cologne
摘要:We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multidimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivized. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the direct effects of monitoring and penalizing mistakes on work quality and evaluate spillovers on unmonitored dimensions of productivity ( punctuality and theft). We find that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are ...
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作者:Jing, Bing
摘要:We study the effects of customer recognition and behavior-based price discrimination (BPD) in a two-period experience good duopoly with a discrete value distribution, and we investigate the role of consumers' ex ante valuation uncertainty in dynamic price competition through comparison with an inspection good duopoly. Several results are reached. First, the firms may reward repeat purchase when the probability of a high value is relatively low and when the high-low value difference is large; o...
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作者:Shi, Pengyi; Chou, Mabel C.; Dai, J. G.; Ding, Ding; Sim, Joe
作者单位:Purdue University System; Purdue University; National University of Singapore; Cornell University; University of International Business & Economics; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要:One key factor contributing to emergency department (ED) overcrowding is prolonged waiting time for admission to inpatient wards, also known as ED boarding time. To gain insights into reducing this waiting time, we study operations in the inpatient wards and their interface with the ED. We focus on understanding the effect of inpatient discharge policies and other operational policies on the time-of-day waiting time performance, such as the fraction of patients waiting longer than six hours in...
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作者:Karlan, Dean; McConnell, Margaret; Mullainathan, Sendhil; Zinman, Jonathan
作者单位:Yale University; Harvard University; Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health; Harvard University; Dartmouth College
摘要:We provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts. Messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective, whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects. Nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect. These empirical res...
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作者:Luca, Michael; Zervas, Georgios
作者单位:Harvard University; Boston University
摘要:Consumer reviews are now part of everyday decision making. Yet the credibility of these reviews is fundamentally undermined when businesses commit review fraud, creating fake reviews for themselves or their competitors. We investigate the economic incentives to commit review fraud on the popular review platform Yelp, using two complementary approaches and data sets. We begin by analyzing restaurant reviews that are identified by Yelp's filtering algorithm as suspicious, or fake-and treat these...
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作者:Anand, Amber; Hua, Jian; McCormick, Tim
作者单位:Syracuse University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要:We examine the make-take structure, which compensates liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders, in the options markets where it competes with a traditional structure that uses payments for order flow. Using the introduction of the make-take structure as an event, we find that execution costs (including fees) for liquidity demanders decline after the event for the affected options, that the make-take structure encourages market makers to improve quoted prices, and that brokers change...
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作者:Caldieraro, Fabio
作者单位:Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要:We investigate the optimal market entry and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) decisions of a firm facing a market in which firms' brands can be horizontally differentiated and products can be vertically differentiated. The entrant might sell under its own brand and compete with an incumbent, become a supplier to the incumbent, or both. Findings reveal that when consumers perceive the firms are horizontally and vertically differentiated, the entrant profits by simultaneously entering the ma...
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作者:Koester, Allison; Lundholm, Russell; Soliman, Mark
作者单位:Georgetown University; University of British Columbia; University of Southern California
摘要:We investigate why extreme positive earnings surprises occur and the consequences of these events. We posit that managers know before analysts when extremely good earnings news is developing, but can have incentives to allow the earnings news to surprise the market at the earnings announcement. In particular, managers can use an extreme positive earnings surprise to attract investor attention when they believe their stock is neglected and future performance is expected to be strong. Analysts, ...
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作者:Eliaz, Kfir; Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位:Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Columbia University
摘要:The classical Ellsberg experiment presents individuals with a choice problem in which the probability of winning a prize is unknown (uncertain). In this paper, we study how individuals make choices between gambles in which the uncertainty is in different dimensions: the winning probability, the amount of the prize, the payment date, and the combinations thereof. Although the decision-theoretic models accommodate a rich variety of behaviors, we present experimental evidence that points at syste...
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作者:Rajan, Raghuram G.; Ramcharan, Rodney
作者单位:University of Chicago; University of Southern California
摘要:The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was felt over half a century later. This paper studies the congressional voting behavior surrounding the act's passage. We find that congressmen in districts in which landholdings were concentrated and credit was costlier were significantly more likely to oppose the act. The evidence suggests that whereas the law and the overall regulatory structure can shape the financ...