Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shang, Weixin; Ha, Albert Y.; Tong, Shilu
• 署名单位: Lingnan University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 245-263
• 关键词: Supply Chain Management; common retailer; incentive; information sharing; nonlinear production cost; manufacturer competition

摘要

We study the problem of information sharing in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. Our analysis shows that the retailer's incentive to share information strongly depends on nonlinear production cost, competition intensity, and whether the retailer can offer a contract to charge a payment for the information. Without information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information for free when production economy is large but has no incentive to do so when there is production diseconomy. With information contracting, the retailer has an incentive to share information when either production diseconomy/economy is large or competition is intense. We characterize the conditions under which the retailer shares information with none, one, or both of the manufacturers. We also show that the retailer prefers to sell information sequentially rather than concurrently to the manufacturers, whereas the manufacturers' preferences are reversed.