The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Finus, M; Tjotta, S
• 署名单位: Fern University Hagen; University of Bergen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00042-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 2031-2048
• 关键词: international environmental agreements; sulfur reduction; self-enforcing and effective treaties

摘要

The increasing number of international environmental agreements (IEAs), and the fact that under some agreements emissions have been reduced beyond agreed targets, are frequently viewed as success stories of international cooperation. We argue that success can only be measured if abatement targets under an IEA are compared with estimated abatement levels in the absence of a treaty, and are evaluated in terms of costs and benefits. We analyze the Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction, showing that this IEA is not the great leap forward when compared with the calculated Nash equilibrium and the social optimum. However, we also demonstrate that under the Oslo Protocol, more ambitious targets could not have been realized due to strong free rider incentives. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.