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作者：Uren, Lawrence; Virag, Gabor
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Rochester
摘要：We analyze wage inequality, extending the Burdett and Mortensen (International Economic Review 39 (1998), 257-73) model by incorporating worker heterogeneity through skill requirements. We provide sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium where more productive firms offer higher wages. The unique such equilibrium is characterized in a closed form solution. Both within- and between-group inequality are explicitly calculated. We then calibrate the model to explain the joint movement ...
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作者：Peck, James; Yang, Huanxing
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study investment cycles in a social learning model, where investment returns fluctuate according to a Markov process. In our Waiting Game, agents observe the investment history and a private signal correlated with the current period's investment return. Agents then decide whether to invest immediately or to delay their decision to later in the period. Cascades in which everyone invests or no one invests eventually reverse themselves. As compared to the No-Waiting Game with no opportunity fo...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：I study the implications of interpersonal communication for incentives for consumers to acquire information and firms' pricing behavior Firms market a homogeneous product and choose its price consumers acquire price infor mation at some cost to themselves Also each consumer accesses the information acquired by a sample of other consumers-interpersonal communication An exogenous increase in the level of interpersonal communication de creases the information that consumers acquire and when searc...
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作者：Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; Yang, C. C.
作者单位：National Taiwan University; National Chengchi University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Feng Chia University
摘要：This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn s (American Political Science Review 83 (1989) 1181-206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information Of many findings we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns the offer concern a la Spence s signaling (the higher the type the better) and the coalition inclusion' concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better) and (i...
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作者：Ching, Andrew T.
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This article incorporates consumer learning and heterogeneity Into a dynamic oligopoly model for the prescription drug market In the model both firms and patients need to learn the generic qualities via patients experiences generic firms entry decisions are endogenous but their entry timings depend on a random approval process I apply the model to examine the impact of shortening the expected generic approval time Although this policy experiment brings generics to the market sooner it increase...
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作者：Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Arizona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In markets with adverse selection, only low-quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low. We show that under decentralized trade, however, both high-and low-quality units trade, although with delay. Moreover, when frictions are small, the surplus realized is greater than the (static) competitive surplus. Thus, decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem. Remarkably, payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish, even though b...
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作者：Jones, Larry E.; Schoonbroodt, Alice
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Demographers emphasize decreased mortality and economic development as the main contributors generating the demographic transition. Contrary to previous findings, we show that simple dynastic models a la Barro-Becker can reproduce observed changes in fertility in response to decreased mortality and increased productivity growth if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough. We show that this is largely due to number and welfare of children being substitutes in the utility of pa...
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作者：Sonmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at business schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms: to infer student preferences and to determine who have bigger claims on course seats. We show that these two roles may easily conflict, and preferences induced from bids may significantly differ from the true preferences. Therefore, these mechanisms, which are promoted as market mechanisms, do not necessarily yield mark...
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作者：Becker, Johannes; Fuest, Clemens
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of Oxford
摘要：A large part of border crossing investment takes the form of international mergers and acquisitions. In this article, we ask how optimal repatriation tax systems look like in a world where investment involves a change of ownership, instead of a reallocation of real capital. We find that the standard results of international taxation do not carry over to the case of international mergers and acquisitions. The deduction system is no longer optimal from a national perspective and the foreign tax ...
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作者：Riboni, Alessandro
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating...
