ON MAJORITARIAN BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; Yang, C. C.
署名单位：
National Taiwan University; National Chengchi University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Feng Chia University
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00607.x
发表日期：
2010
页码：
959-979
关键词：
摘要：
This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn s (American Political Science Review 83 (1989) 1181-206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information Of many findings we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns the offer concern a la Spence s signaling (the higher the type the better) and the coalition inclusion' concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better) and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay
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