COMMITTEES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR COMMITMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Riboni, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00577.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 213-236
• 关键词: monetary-policy; dynamic theory; reputation; MODEL; equilibrium; preferences; inflation; taxation

摘要

In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating example, this article focuses on the time consistency of monetary policy.