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作者：Tsuyuhara, Kunio
作者单位：University of Calgary
摘要：This article proposes a model with dynamic incentive contracts and on-the-job search in a frictional labor market. The optimal long-term contract exhibits an increasing wage-tenure profile. With increasing wages, worker effort also increases with tenure. These two features imply that the probabilities of both voluntary and involuntary job separation decrease with both job tenure and the duration of employment. Given these results, workers experience differing labor market transitionsbetween em...
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作者：Foerster, Andrew T.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City
摘要：This article considers the determinacy and distributional consequences of regime switching in monetary policy. Although switching in the inflation target does not affect determinacy, switches in the inflation response can cause indeterminacy. Satisfying the Taylor principle period by period is neither necessary nor sufficient for determinacy when inflation responses switch; indeterminacy can arise if monetary policy responds too aggressively to inflation in the active regime. Inflation target ...
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作者：Citanna, Alessandro; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：Yeshiva University; Columbia University
摘要：We decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a competitive market for mechanisms, that is, for menus of contracts. Facing a budget constraint, informed individuals purchase (lottery) tickets to enter mechanisms, whereas firms sell tickets and supply slots at mechanisms at given prices. Beyond optimization, market clearing, and rational expectations, an equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change, or cut, prices. An equilibrium ...
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作者：Allen, Jason; Chapman, James; Echenique, Federico; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：Bank of Canada; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Using detailed transactions-level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct p...
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作者：Rho, Youngwoo; Rodrigue, Joel
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：This article characterizes the complementarity between exporting and investment in physical capital. We argue that new investment allows young exporters to grow faster and survive longer in export markets while reducing their vulnerability to productivity or demand shocks across markets. We structurally estimate our model using detailed firm-level data. We find that the choice of cost structure has a large impact on model performance and the estimated costs of exporting or investment. Using de...
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作者：Stacey, Derek
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segm...
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作者：Ju, Heng; Tan, Guofu
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Southern California
摘要：We develop models of bilateral oligopoly with traffic exchanges to study the competition and regulatory policies in the international telephone markets. Under the requirement of uniform settlement rates, the proportional return rule (PRR) inflates the rates and hence neutralizes PRR's effect on calling prices. Retail competition and PRR increase net settlement payments. Market efficiency is improved when there are multiple channels for traffic exchanges. Using a panel of 47 countries that exch...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Leroux, Marie-Louise; Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Gregory
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Liege; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universite Paris-Est-Creteil-Val-de-Marne (UPEC); Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies, and (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimu...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This article investigates how helping behavior can be sustained in large societies in the presence of agents who never help. I consider a game with many players who are anonymously and randomly matched every period in pairs. Within each match, one player may provide socially optimal but individually costly help to the other player. I introduce and characterize the class of linear equilibria in which, unlike equilibria used in the previous literature, there is help even in the presence of behav...
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer...
