COMMITMENT AND COSTLY SIGNALING IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stacey, Derek
• 署名单位: Toronto Metropolitan University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12206
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1507-1533
• 关键词: real-estate; house prices; search; liquidity; agents; sales; time

摘要

I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segmenting the market to alleviate information frictions. Seemingly irrelevant but incentive compatible listing fees are implementable provided that the market is not already sufficiently active.