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作者：Blanchet, Adrien; Mossay, Pascal; Santambrogio, Filippo
作者单位：Newcastle University - UK; Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We extend Beckmann's spatial model of social interactions to the case of a two-dimensional spatial economy with a large class of utility functions, accessing costs, and space-dependent amenities. We show that spatial equilibria derive from a potential functional. By proving the existence of a minimizer of the functional, we obtain that of spatial equilibrium. Under mild conditions on the primitives of the economy, the functional is shown to satisfy displacement convexity. Moreover, the strict ...
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作者：Hosono, Kaoru; Miyakawa, Daisuke; Uchino, Taisuke; Hazama, Makoto; Ono, Arito; Uchida, Hirofumi; Uesugi, Iichiro
作者单位：Gakushuin University; Hitotsubashi University; Chuo University; Kobe University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This article investigates the effect of banks' lending capacity on firms' investment. To identify exogenous shocks to loan supply, we utilize the natural experiment provided by Japan's Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995. Using a unique data set that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake-affected areas, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside the earthquake-affected areas but having a main bank inside the areas was significantly smaller than that of firm...
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作者：Martimort, David; Straub, Stephane
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze how long-term uncertainty, for example, regarding future climate conditions, affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal-agent context, with dynamic moral hazard, limited liability, and irreversibility constraints. The prospect of future, uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm's effort creates an option value of delaying efforts, a course that exacerbates agency costs. Contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control ...
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作者：DeVaro, Jed; Guertler, Oliver
作者单位：California State University System; California State University East Bay; University of Cologne
摘要：We provide a new theory to explain why firms multitask workers instead of specializing them. Workers overperform in tasks they like and underperform in tasks they dislike to favorably influence future job assignments. Anticipating this, firms may find it optimal to commit to future multitasking to induce workers to appropriately allocate effort early in the employment relationship. We show that when the product market is volatile, so that future product prices are uncertain, the firm's ability...
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作者：Grieco, Paul L. E.; Li, Shengyu; Zhang, Hongsong
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Durham University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We propose a method to consistently estimate production functions in the presence of input price dispersion when intermediate input quantities are not observed. We find that the traditional approach to dealing with unobserved input quantitiesusing deflated expenditure as a proxysubstantially biases the production estimates. In contrast, our method controls for heterogeneous input prices by exploiting the first-order conditions of the firm's profit maximization problem and consistently recovers...
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作者：Basile, Achille; Graziano, Maria Gabriella; Pesce, Marialaura
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II
摘要：We study economies that involve both small and large traders as well as the choice of a public project. Within this framework, we establish two sufficient conditions under which the set of competitive allocations coincides with the core. Our first core equivalence result holds under the assumption that there is a countably infinite set of large traders similar to each other. The second result, independent of the number of large traders, requires the existence of a coalition of small traders wi...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：University of Oxford; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and Stackelberg stability (no player can ...
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作者：Sieg, Holger
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作者：Kormilitsina, Anna; Nekipelov, Denis
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Virginia
摘要：The Laplace-type estimator has become popular in applied macroeconomics, in particular for estimation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. It is often obtained as the mean and variance of a parameter's quasi-posterior distribution, which is defined using a classical estimation objective. We demonstrate that the objective must be properly scaled; otherwise, arbitrarily small confidence intervals can be obtained if calculated directly from the quasi-posterior distribution. We...
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作者：Kawaura, Akihiko; La Croix, Sumner
作者单位：Doshisha University; University of Hawaii System
摘要：Teams in Japan's two professional baseball leagues began to add foreign players in the early 1950s, with the average number per team reaching 5.79 in 2004. This was primarily because foreign hitters outperformed Japanese hitters. Hazard analysis shows that a poorly performing team was more likely to hire its first Caucasian and African American players earlier than a successful team. Econometric analysis of team use of foreign players over 45 seasons (1960-2004) shows that losing Central Leagu...
