Zero-sum games with ambiguity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosenberg, Dinah; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.013
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 238-249
• 关键词: Uncertainty aversion; ambiguity; zero-sum games; incomplete information

摘要

We study whether the basic tenets of the theory of zero-sum games are still valid when players are uncertainty averse. We focus on games with one-sided information, in which the uninformed player is uncertain about the state of nature. Uncertainty aversion turns the underlying zero-sum game into a many-player, non-zero-sum game. We show that the uninformed player has a unique equilibrium payoff. We provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium payoff vector. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.