Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nunez, Matias; Pivato, Marcus
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; CY Cergy Paris Universite
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.009
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 285-305
• 关键词: Large elections; strategic voting; Truth-revelation; Stochastic voting rule; Bayesian Nash implementation

摘要

We propose a new solution to the problem of strategic voting for large electorates. For any deterministic voting rule, we design a stochastic rule that asymptotically approximates it in the following sense: for a sufficiently large population of voters, the stochastic voting rule (i) incentivizes every voter to reveal her true preferences and (ii) produces the same outcome as the deterministic rule, with arbitrarily high probability. We then apply these results to obtain an implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.