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作者：Miller, Marcus; Stiglitz, Joseph
作者单位：University of Warwick; Columbia University
摘要：An iconic model with high leverage and overvalued collateral assets is used to illustrate the amplification mechanism driving asset prices to 'overshoot' equilibrium when an asset bubble bursts - threatening widespread insolvency and what Richard Koo calls a 'balance sheet recession'. Besides interest rates cuts, asset purchases and capital restructuring are key to crisis resolution. The usual bankruptcy procedures for doing this fail to internalise the price effects of asset 'fire-sales' to p...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Walzl, Markus
作者单位：University of Konstanz; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether 'Walrasian' platforms, leading to market-clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers compete, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer....
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
作者单位：University of Vienna; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：We consider a government auctioning off multiple licences to firms that compete in an aftermarket. Firms have different costs, and cost-efficiency is private information in the auction and in the aftermarket. If only one licence is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction as it has the highest valuation for the licence. We analyse conditions under which this result does and does not generalise to the case of auctioning multiple licences and aftermarket comp...
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作者：Cassar, A.; Friedman, D.; Schneider, P. H.
作者单位：University of San Francisco; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：When contracts are not perfectly enforceable, can interpersonal networks improve market efficiency? We introduce certain exogenous networks into laboratory markets in which traders can cheat in 'international' but not in 'domestic' transactions. We examine four network configurations, one of which has the potential to achieve 100% efficiency. Theoretical upper bounds correctly predict the main qualitative trade patterns across our network configurations but overpredict observed efficiency. Our...
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作者：Harbaugh, William T. .; Krause, Kate; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：University of Oregon; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of New Mexico; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We examine the robustness of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes under two elicitation procedures. We find that individuals are, on average, risk-seeking over low-probability gains and high-probability losses and risk-averse over high-probability gains and low-probability losses when we elicit prices for the gambles. However, a choice-based elicitation procedure, where participants choose between a gamble and its expected value, yields individual decisions that are indistinguishable from ra...
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作者：Arestis, Philip; Chortareas, Georgios; Tsoukalas, John D.
作者单位：University of Cambridge; National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; University of Essex; University of Nottingham
摘要：We consider an (otherwise standard) New Neoclassical Synthesis theoretical framework that allows a role for money. Money in our model has an informational role which facilitates the estimation of the unobserved shocks that drive potential output and thus the state of the economy. For this purpose we estimate a small-scale sticky price model using Bayesian techniques. Our findings support the view that money has information value. This is reflected in higher precision in terms of unobserved mod...
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作者：Etro, Federico; Colciago, Andrea
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We characterise endogenous market structures under Bertrand and Cournot competition in a DSGE model. Short-run mark ups vary countercyclically because of the impact of entry on competition. Long-run mark ups are decreasing in the discount factor and in productivity, and increasing in the exit rate and in the entry costs. Dynamic inefficiency can emerge due to excessive entry under Cournot competition. Positive temporary shocks attract entry, which strengthens competition so as to reduce the ma...
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作者：Arrunada, Benito
作者单位：Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This article develops two hypotheses about economically-relevant values of Christian believers, according to which Protestants should work more and more effectively, as in the 'work ethic' argument of Max Weber, or display a stronger 'social ethic' that would lead them to monitor each other's conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold more homogeneous values. Tests using current survey data confirm substantial partial correlations and possible different 'effects' in mutual soci...
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作者：Knabe, Andreas; Raetzel, Steffen; Schoeb, Ronnie; Weimann, Joachim
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; Otto von Guericke University
摘要：We apply the Day Reconstruction Method to compare unemployed and employed people with respect to their subjective assessment of emotional affects, differences in the composition and duration of activities during the course of a day and their self-reported life satisfaction. Employed persons are more satisfied with their life than the unemployed and report more positive feelings when engaged in similar activities. Weighting these activities with their duration shows, however, that average exper...
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作者：Saint-Paul, Gilles
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：I analyse a model where workers self-select in the educational occupation in a way which is correlated with their beliefs about the working of the market economy. Teachers have a disproportionate effect on the transmission of beliefs. Therefore, they generate a bias which makes it harder for the population to learn the true parameters of the economy if these are favourable to the market economy. Two parameters determine this bias. Social entropy defines how predictable one's occupation is as a...
