Do auctions select efficient firms?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02334.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1319-1344
• 关键词: aftermarket; COMPETITION

摘要

We consider a government auctioning off multiple licences to firms that compete in an aftermarket. Firms have different costs, and cost-efficiency is private information in the auction and in the aftermarket. If only one licence is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction as it has the highest valuation for the licence. We analyse conditions under which this result does and does not generalise to the case of auctioning multiple licences and aftermarket competition. Strategic interaction in the aftermarket is responsible for the fact that auctions may select inefficient firms.