A Laboratory Investigation of Networked Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cassar, A.; Friedman, D.; Schneider, P. H.
• 署名单位: University of San Francisco; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02326.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 919-943
• 关键词: trade; COOPERATION; INFORMATION; reputation; NORMS; LAW

摘要

When contracts are not perfectly enforceable, can interpersonal networks improve market efficiency? We introduce certain exogenous networks into laboratory markets in which traders can cheat in 'international' but not in 'domestic' transactions. We examine four network configurations, one of which has the potential to achieve 100% efficiency. Theoretical upper bounds correctly predict the main qualitative trade patterns across our network configurations but overpredict observed efficiency. Our networks increase international trade volume, reduce domestic volume and divert high surplus transactions to international networks.